We investigate the implications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation. We develop a two-country, two-firm model, in which the firms produce horizontally differentiated products and act as Bertrand competitors. Assuming that there is asymmetry in consumer nationalism between countries, we show that the country with the (relatively more) nationalist consumers can sustain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in a repeated-game setting. Moreover, its most cooperative equilibrium tariff is actually decreasing in the level of its consumers' nationalism, provided that countries are not too patient. On the other hand, asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries produces an anti-cooperation effect on the incentives of the country with the non-nationalist consumers.
Introduction
The world has been experiencing a revival of economic nationalism in recent years. The most prominent manifestations of this trend are the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th
President of the United States on the platform of "Make America Great Again" as well as the outcome of the Brexit referendum. This new wave of economic nationalism-intertwined with populism-poses a serious threat to the liberal international order that has dominated the world after World War II, key elements of which are economic openness and multilateral institutions (Ikenberry, 2018) . In fact, the elevated trade tensions between the United States and its major trade partners in the Trump era clearly attest how grave this threat is. In this paper, we focus on the consumer side and assess theoretically the implications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation.
Consumer nationalism or consumer ethnocentrism-with the latter term being extensively used in the international business literature-refers to the phenomenon of consumer bias against foreign products and in favor of domestic ones. According to the seminal work by Shimp and Sharma (1987, page 280) , for ethnocentric consumers, "purchasing imported products is wrong because, in their minds, it hurts the domestic economy, causes loss of jobs, and is plainly unpatriotic,"
1 whereas for non-ethnocentric consumers, "foreign products are objects to be evaluated on their own merits without consideration for where they are made."
A large number of empirical studies have demonstrated that consumer ethnocentrism has a significant impact on consumers' buying intentions and purchase behavior toward domestic and imported products (see, for example, Shimp and Sharma, 1987; Herche, 1992 world trading system and, in particular, for multilateral tariff cooperation. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed so far in the literature. This is the objective of this paper, which explores the ramifications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation in the context of self-enforcing cooperative agreements.
We develop a two-country, two-firm model, in which the firms produce horizontally differentiated products and engage in Bertrand price competition. We model consumer nationalism as a demand shifter. More specifically, stronger nationalist consumer preferences translate in our framework into an outward shift of the demand for the domestic product along with an inward shift of the demand for the import product. Moreover, we assume that there is asymmetry in consumer nationalism between the two trade partners, which is in line with the empirical findings in the literature on cross-country differences in consumer ethnocentrism (see, for instance, Good and Huddleston, 1995; Pereira et al., 2002; Han, 2017; Han and Won, 2018) . The governments and firms interact in an infinitely repeated two-stage game: in the first stage, the governments select their import tariffs, while in the second stage, the firms choose their prices in both markets. We finally assume-as is standard in the literature on trade agreements-that countries are limited to self-enforcing multilateral agreements, i.e., agreements balancing for each country its short-term gains from defection from the agreedupon trade policies against its long-term welfare losses due to the trade war its unilateral defection would ignite.
Three main results emerge from our analysis. First, the non-cooperative Nash tariff of a given country is decreasing in the degree of domestic consumer nationalism. The dominant force driving this result is the fact that consumer nationalism reduces the demand for imports, thereby having a dampening effect on a country's tariff-revenue gain from marginally raising its import tariff. Second, the country with the (relatively more) nationalist consumers is able to maintain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our repeated-game setting. In fact, for a sufficiently low discount factor, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the former is decreasing in the level of its consumers' nationalism; by contrast, as far as the country with the non-nationalist consumers is concerned, its most cooperative equilibrium tariff is always increasing in the degree of nationalism characterizing its trade partner's consumers. This is our third main finding. Intuitively, consumer nationalism in a given country has a negative impact on its potential one-time gains from deviation from the cooperative course as well as on both trade partners' per-period benefit from cooperation. In other words, asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries produces an anti-cooperation effect on the incentives of the country with the non-nationalist consumers, while in the case of the country with the nationalist ones, there are two offsetting forces at work. However, for a sufficiently small discount factor, its pro-cooperation effect on the latter country's incentives-i.e., its negative impact on the country's one-time gains from cheating-unambiguously dominates.
It is important to stress here that our results extend to the more general case in which there is a home bias in consumption or, equivalently for our purposes, there are border ef- The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basics of our model. Section 3 derives the non-cooperative Nash tariff equilibrium that would emerge in a one-shot interaction between countries. Section 4 analyzes the implications of asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries for multilateral tariff cooperation in the context of asymmetric multilateral trade agreements, whereas Section 5 repeats the analysis focusing on symmetric agreements. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
The Model
We assume that the world consists of two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). There exists one firm in each country: firm h in Home and firm f in Foreign. The two firms produce horizontally differentiated products-i.e., consumers view firms' products as imperfect substitutes for each other. Markets are segmented and firms compete in pricesà la Bertrand in both countries.
The demand for product i ∈ {h, f } in country j ∈ {H, F }, q j i , is given by:
where p j i is the price charged by firm i in market j and −i ∈ {h, f } \ {i}. Moreover, α , demand is more responsive to own-price changes than cross-price ones).
2 On the production side, the firms have constant marginal costs, c h and c f , and no fixed cost of production. We further assume that α j i > β j i c i . The governments and firms engage in a two-stage game as follows:
The two governments simultaneously pick specific (non-prohibitive) tariffs so as to maximize national welfare.
Stage 2:
The two firms simultaneously select their prices in both markets so as to maximize their aggregate profit. 2 Note that γ j i > 0 reflects the fact that the goods are substitutes.
One-Shot Game
We first characterize the tariff equilibrium that would emerge in a non-cooperative environment. In particular, let us assume that the governments and firms engage in a one-shot interaction. We solve our two-stage game backwards in order to identify its subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Stage 2: Bertrand Competition
Let τ j denote the import tariff imposed by country j ∈ {H, F }. The aggregate profits of firms h and f , respectively, from sales in both markets equal:
It is immediate to show that
meaning that firms' prices in a given market are strategic complements.
Each firm chooses two prices, and setting ∂π i /∂p j i = 0 for j ∈ {H, F }, we obtain firm i's (i ∈ {h, f }) first-order conditions, yielding:
, and
Finally, straightforward algebra provides us with the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices charged by firms in the two markets:
, and (10)
The resulting equilibrium quantities, then, equal:
, and (14)
It is important to note here than an increase in τ H raises the equilibrium prices of both goods in Home, with the impact on p
being relatively larger (in absolute terms). 3 In addition, a higher τ H results in a market-share gain for firm h in its domestic market at the expense of firm f , as
Analogous relationships hold for Foreign as far as changes in its tariff level are concerned.
Stage 1: Tariff Equilibrium
We define the welfare of country j ∈ {H, F }, W j , as the sum of consumer surplus (from consumption of both goods), domestic firm's aggregate profit, and tariff revenue. More specifically:
3 From Equations (8) and (11), we have that
The term "market share" here and throughout the paper refers to unit market share.
With Equations (16)- (17) 
Nash Tariff Equilibrium under Consumer Nationalism
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that stronger nationalist consumer preferences translate into a parallel outward shift of the demand for the domestic product accompanied by a parallel inward shift of the demand for the import product. In other words, stronger nationalist preferences in, for instance, Home would imply a higher α To get some first insights into the ramifications of consumer nationalism for the multilateral trading system, let us examine its impact on the Nash tariff equilibrium of our one-shot game.
As we discussed in the introduction, in line with the empirical findings in the literature on cross-country differences in consumer ethnocentrism, we assume that there is asymmetry in consumer nationalism between Home and Foreign. In particular, let us now introduce nationalist consumer preferences only in Home and explore their implications for both τ It can be readily shown that:
Thus, if β H i is "large" relative to γ H i and γ H −i -which is the reasonable assumption to makethen ∂τ H N /∂k < 0, meaning that the Nash tariff of Home is decreasing in Home consumers' nationalism (i.e., in k). Intuitively, when optimally choosing its import tariff, a country must consider the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of protection, which are determined by how consumer surplus, tariff revenue, and the profit of the domestic firm vary as the level of import protection rises. Here, the dominant force driving the result is the fact that an increase in k lowers, ceteris paribus, Home import demand (to the benefit of the domestic firm h), thereby having a dampening effect on the tariff-revenue gain for Home from marginally raising τ H .
On the other hand, the Nash tariff of Foreign, τ 
Tariff Cooperation under Consumer Nationalism
In order to explore the implications of asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries for multilateral tariff cooperation, we now allow for infinitely repeated interaction between Home and Foreign. More specifically, we consider the infinite repetition of the two-stage game analyzed above, while assuming that Home consumers exhibit nationalist preferences as modeled in Section 3.3 (i.e., α
. In each periodcomprising two stages-the governments choose import tariffs with perfect information with respect to all past tariff choices. Moreover, let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor between periods.
As is standard in the literature on trade agreements, we assume that countries are limited to cooperative agreements that are self-enforcing, i.e., agreements balancing for each country its one-time gains from defection from the agreed-upon trade policies against its discounted future welfare losses due to the trade war a unilateral defection would ignite.
7 Furthermore, to focus on the main points of our paper (and for tractability), firms are assumed to act as Bertrand competitors in every period of the repeated game-i.e., the possibility of firm collusion is excluded.
For this asymmetric game, we first consider asymmetric cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria in which (i) along the equilibrium path, Home and Foreign select, respectively, the cooperative tariffs τ We begin our analysis by looking at countries' potential gains from cheating. Clearly, a country opting to deviate from the cooperative course does best by selecting its best-response tariff. The one-time gains from cheating for country j, then, equal:
Ω j simply equals the one-time welfare gains for country j from deviating to its best-response tariff, τ j N , while its trade partner −j still cooperates with τ −j C . However, violating multilateral cooperation comes at a cost as it leads to an infinite reversion to non-cooperative Nash play. The discounted future welfare loss a defector faces is given by:
where
is the per-period value of cooperation for country j, i.e., the per-period difference in its welfare under multilateral cooperation and during a tariff war.
Using Equations (19) and (20), we can now formally state the no-defect condition for Home and Foreign:
Any cooperative tariff pair τ H C , τ F C that satisfies inequalities (21)- (22) can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the infinitely repeated two-stage game. Our interest lies in the most cooperative equilibrium tariff pair, τ H C , τ F C , which can be obtained by solving simultaneously (21)- (22) for the smallest tariffs that give equalities.
8
As the model is rather complicated, we need to resort to numerical analysis in order to gain some further insights into the implications of (asymmetric) consumer nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation.
9 Furthermore, to focus on the main points of our analysis, we assume henceforth that α
, and c i = c for all i ∈ {h, f } and j ∈ {H, F }, with β being "large" relative to γ.
10
The main result that emerges from our numerical analysis is that, for reasonable parameter values, τ H C < τ F C for all k > 0. In other words, the country with the nationalist consumers is able to maintain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner. The intuition underlying this finding is rather involved. We proceed by analyzing in detail the impact of consumer nationalism in Home on both countries' one-time gains from cheating (i.e., Ω j ) and per-period benefit from cooperation (i.e., ω j ).
Let us start by examining the ramifications of nationalist preferences in Home for its per- dominate, meaning that consumer nationalism in Home has an overall negative effect on its per-period benefit from multilateral trade cooperation.
We next turn to the per-period benefit from cooperation for Foreign, ω F . Home consumers'
9 The numerical analysis was carried out using Mathematica (the code is available upon request). 10 Recall, though, that α
Moreover, in our numerical analysis, we impose that β > 2γ (see footnote 6).
one at play. On the other hand, Home consumers' nationalism has no effect on Ω F , which is a direct consequence of our assumptions of segmented markets and constant marginal costs.
To sum up, consumer nationalism in Home affects negatively ω H , ω F , and Ω H , whereas it has no implications for Ω F . Our result that τ H C < τ F C for all k > 0 thereby follows. 12 At a more general level, our analysis demonstrates that the country with the nationalist consumers can sustain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our infinitely repeated two-stage game.
In fact, for a sufficiently low discount factor δ, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of
Home not only is lower than the one of Foreign, but also is decreasing in the degree of Home consumers' nationalism (i.e., ∂ τ H C /∂k < 0 for "low" δ). The intuition underlying the latter result is straightforward. Recall that consumer nationalism in Home affects negatively its one-time gains from defection as well as its per-period benefit from cooperation. Note now that the discounted value of future cooperation that appears on the right-hand side of the no-defect conditions (21)- (22) is a function of both the per-period value of cooperation and the discount factor. As a result, for sufficiently low δ, the pro-cooperation effect of Home consumers' nationalism on the incentive constraint faced by the Home government (i.e., its negative impact on Ω H ) is the dominant force at work. Thus, in the "low"-δ case, the higher k is, the more liberal the trade policies that can be maintained by Home in equilibriumwhile the reverse holds in the case of "high" δ. On the other hand, τ 
Symmetric Multilateral Agreements
In this section, we explore the implications of asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries for multilateral tariff cooperation in the context of symmetric (self-enforcing) multilateral trade agreements. What follows should be regarded as robustness analysis, as given the asymmetry between Home and Foreign (due to consumer preferences), it is only natural to place our main focus on asymmetric cooperative subgame-perfect equilibria.
Let τ H C = τ F C ≡ τ C denote the symmetric cooperative tariff selected by Home and Foreign along the equilibrium path. We then have the following no-defect conditions for the two trade partners:
From all the cooperative tariffs that satisfy (23)- (24), our interest lies in the most cooperative one, τ C , which is the smallest tariff that does not violate (23)- (24) .
Our numerical analysis shows that as τ C is lowered, a critical tariff is eventually reached at which the incentive constraint for the Foreign government binds, whereas the incentive constraint for the Home government is slack (i.e., (23) holds with strict inequality at the tariff in question). The fact that as the cooperative tariff is lowered, Foreign's incentive constraint is the first one to bind is not surprising given our analysis in Section 4. The aforementioned critical tariff is the most cooperative symmetric equilibrium tariff of our infinitely repeated two-stage game, τ C . Figure 3 depicts τ C as a function of k. As the figure demonstrates, τ C is increasing in the degree of Home consumers' nationalism. Intuitively, consumer nationalism in Home has no effect on Foreign's one-time gains from cheating, Ω F , but it does have a negative impact-for the reasons described in Section 4-on the per-period benefit from cooperation for Foreign, ω F . 13 Therefore, in the context of symmetric trade agreements, asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries unambiguously has negative implications for multilateral trade cooperation. 13 We do not analyze here the impact of consumer nationalism in Home on ω H and Ω H as the incentive constraint for the Home government is slack at τ C . 
k

Conclusions
We have presented the first theoretical analysis of the implications of consumer nationalism for multilateral tariff cooperation. This is an important endeavor given that a large number of empirical studies have documented the significant impact of consumer ethnocentrism on consumers' buying intentions and purchase behavior toward domestically produced goods and imports. We have developed a two-country, two-firm model, in which the governments and firms interact in an infinitely repeated two-stage game: in the first stage, the governments choose their import tariffs, while in the second stage, the firms, which produce horizontally differentiated products, select their prices in both markets. We have assumed that there is asymmetry in consumer nationalism between the two trade partners and that nationalist consumer preferences simply act as a demand shifter-which allows our results to extend to the more general case of asymmetric consumption home bias across countries.
We have demonstrated that the country with the (relatively more) nationalist consumers can sustain more liberal trade policies than its trade partner in our repeated-game setting.
Perhaps more importantly, as long as the discount factor is not too high-which is the empirically relevant case-the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the former country (i.e., the country with the nationalist consumers) is decreasing in the level of its consumers' nationalism. On the other hand, the most cooperative equilibrium tariff of the latter country (i.e., the country with the non-nationalist consumers) is always increasing in the degree of nationalism characterizing its trade partner's consumers.
In conclusion, our analysis shows that the overall effect of asymmetric consumer nationalism across countries on multilateral trade cooperation is ambiguous. Moreover, our findings raise, at a broad level, the interesting possibility of an eruption of a multilateral trade war in the wake of a surge in consumer nationalism around the globe, with the war in question being fueled (primarily) by protectionist actions taken by the countries with the non-nationalist consumers. Of course, further research is required in order to obtain a more complete picture of the ramifications of consumer nationalism for the world trading system (e.g., in terms of its impact on firms' location choice). Still, our paper offers a first set of testable predictions that are intuitive but not obvious.
